SARS in Healthcare Facilities, Toronto and Taiwan by McDonald, L. Clifford et al.
The healthcare setting was important in the early
spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in
both Toronto and Taiwan. Healthcare workers, patients, and
visitors were at increased risk for infection. Nonetheless,
the ability of individual SARS patients to transmit disease
was quite variable. Unrecognized SARS case-patients
were a primary source of transmission, and early detection
and intervention were important to limit spread. Strict
adherence to infection control precautions was essential in
containing outbreaks. In addition, grouping patients into
cohorts and limiting access to SARS patients minimized
exposure opportunities. Given the difficulty in implementing
several of these measures, control measures were fre-
quently adapted to the acuity of SARS care and level of
transmission within facilities. Although these conclusions
are based only on a retrospective analysis of events, apply-
ing the experiences of Toronto and Taiwan to SARS pre-
paredness planning efforts will likely minimize future
transmission within healthcare facilities.
I
n March 2003, reports of healthcare workers with unex-
plained pneumonia in Vietnam initiated an international
investigation of the infection that came to be known as
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (1). The cause
of SARS was later identified as a coronavirus, which was
cultured from specimens provided by a healthcare worker
who subsequently died of SARS (2). During the outbreak,
transmission in hospitals and infection in healthcare work-
ers persisted. In Toronto and Taiwan, nosocomial transmis-
sion played a substantial role in initiating and maintaining
outbreaks of SARS. We summarize our experiences during
these outbreaks to highlight key factors that can help
healthcare and public health officials prevent nosocomial
transmission of SARS. In addition, we offer conclusions
based on an in-depth, retrospective analysis of the events
as they unfolded in these two settings. 
High Risk for Transmission in Healthcare
Workers, Patients, and Visitors 
At the onset of the global outbreak, patients infected
with SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) sought care at emer-
gency departments for symptoms of what appeared to be
common respiratory infections. During such encounters,
minimal infection control measures were implemented
since most known infections did not warrant them.
However, in some circumstances, conditions were favor-
able for efficient transmission of SARS. Many exposed
healthcare workers, patients, and visitors became infected
and subsequently transmitted infection to others in their
healthcare facilities. Nosocomial transmission was the pri-
mary accelerator of SARS infections, accounting for 72%
of cases in Toronto (3) and 55% of probable cases in
Taiwan (Table) (4).
In Toronto, the outbreak unfolded in two phases, both
attributable to nosocomial transmission (Figure 1). The
first phase resulted from a case of unrecognized SARS in
an infected contact of a recent traveler to Hong Kong (5).
The second phase resulted from unknown transmission of
SARS among hospitalized patients during a period when
healthcare workers were being instructed to wear personal
protective equipment, including gowns, gloves, and masks
(6). In Taiwan, the outbreak had two phases (Figure 1).
The first phase consisted of sporadic SARS cases in trav-
elers without nosocomial transmission (7). In the second
phase, transmission at one municipal hospital ignited a
number of subsequent nosocomial outbreaks when SARS
patients were transferred to other facilities (4).
A number of factors may make nosocomial transmis-
sion a common mode of infection. Unlike many other viral
respiratory diseases in which the concentration of virus is
greatest on disease onset, the concentration of SARS-CoV
in secretions appears to peak approximately 10 days after
symptom onset (8) when a patient’s symptoms are often
worsening and may require medical attention. Thus,
patients may be most capable of transmitting the virus at
the point when they encounter healthcare workers. In addi-
tion, transmission appears to be primarily through expo-
sure to respiratory droplets and direct contact with patients
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workers and others in contact with SARS patients may be
more likely to become infected, especially if exposed dur-
ing aerosol-generating procedures (i.e., intubation, nebu-
lizing medications). Finally, even after recognition of
SARS, lapses in infection control measures may be
responsible for infection in healthcare workers.
Whether SARS will occur again, and if so, whether the
epidemiology will be similar to the outbreak in the spring
of 2003 are not known. However, given the severity of ill-
ness seen in SARS patients and their eventual need for
medical attention, healthcare workers and others in health-
care facilities are likely to remain at high risk if SARS
reemerges.
Variation in SARS Communicability 
Over the course of the SARS outbreak, certain persons
and settings were found to be more efficient at transmitting
SARS-CoV infection than others. In Taiwan, after an ini-
tial period of apparent control of SARS by public health
officials (7), exposures to an apparent “super-spreader”
with SARS contributed to an explosion of infections at a
municipal hospital in Taipei (4). An infected hospital laun-
dry attendant continued working despite worsening symp-
toms of diarrhea and pneumonia. Between the onset of his
illness and eventual recognition of SARS, exposures to the
worker and to the hospital led to at least 137 probable
cases, including 45 in healthcare workers. Similarly, a
small number of persons also generated a large number of
cases during the first phase of the Toronto outbreak when
a cluster of healthcare workers were infected with SARS
after the intubation of a severely ill SARS patient (10).
Comparable transmission from one person to many was
seen in Singapore as well (11). 
In contrast, experiences with SARS in the United States
and several other countries have not shown similar super-
spreading patients or events despite opportunities for
transmission (12). The reasons for such variable communi-
cability are uncertain but may be due to innate characteris-
tics of infected patients (13), high virus concentrations in
secretions during peak illness (8), or exposures to aerosol-
generating procedures such as intubation or positive-pres-
sure ventilation (10). Because these procedures are
considered high risks for SARS transmission, guidelines
were developed that emphasize use of PPE and, if needed,
furlough for healthcare workers with unprotected exposure
to these procedures (14).
Transmission from Unrecognized Cases 
On February 23, 2003, a 78-year-old Canadian woman
returned from a visit to Hong Kong. While there, she had
unknowingly been infected with SARS-CoV during her
stay at a hotel in Kowloon (5). After returning to Toronto,
the patient’s condition worsened, and she died at home.
SARS developed in her son, and he was hospitalized with
respiratory distress on March 7. Before his death on March
13, he infected two other patients and one healthcare work-
er, all of whom subsequently exposed others to the infec-
tion before SARS was eventually recognized. Infected
visitors also contributed to transmission in the hospital.
Ultimately, 128 cases were associated with this hospital
outbreak, including 47 (37%) hospital staff and 36 (28%)
patients and visitors (5). Many of these cases occurred
early in the global outbreak and before SARS transmission
was recognized in Canada. Once the disease was recog-
nized, appropriate infection control practices were initiat-
ed so that by May 14, the World Health Organization
advised that Toronto was no longer an “affected area” with
the last locally acquired, recognized case having occurred
on April 20, 2003.
After the first phase of SARS in Toronto, healthcare
workers continued to use extensive personal protective
equipment (e.g., routine contact precautions with an N95
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Table. Characteristics of the SARS outbreak in the greater 
Toronto area and Taiwan, March–June 2003
a 
Characteristic  GTA, no. (%)  Taiwan, no. (%)
b 
Total cases  375  NA
 
Probable   247 (66)  668 
Suspected   128 (34)  NA
 
Deaths  44 (12)  72 (11) 
Healthcare related  271 (72)  370 (55) 
Healthcare workers  164 (44)  120 (18) 
Patients or visitors  107 (28)  256 (38) 
Hospitals with hospitalized SARS 
patients 
23  84 
Hospitals with SARS 
transmission 
10 (43)  8 (10) 
Hospitals that closed wards or 
an emergency room 
10 (43)  NA 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; GTA, greater Toronto area; NA, data 
not available 
bPercentage expresses proportion of all probable SARS cases 
Figure 1. Number of probable cases of severe acute respiratory
syndrome, by location and date of illness onset—Toronto and
Taiwan, February 23–June 15, 2003.or equivalent respirator). However, after a period with no
apparent SARS transmission, public health officials
relaxed the requirement for extensive PPE. Subsequently,
a cluster of SARS cases occurred among healthcare work-
ers, followed by the second phase of SARS transmission in
Toronto (6). In retrospect, investigators determined that
SARS-CoV transmission had continued undetected among
patients. These unrecognized cases occurred later in the
global outbreak and after recognition of SARS transmis-
sion in Canada. 
The experiences from Taiwan and from both outbreak
phases in Toronto underscore the difficulty in detecting
SARS cases and the cascade of infections that can occur
from even one unrecognized case among persons in the
hospital. Symptoms of SARS are nonspecific and may rep-
resent infection due to a number of respiratory pathogens.
Without rapid diagnostic tests, clinicians must rely for
diagnosis on a patient’s history of travel, exposure to
healthcare facilities, or contact with patients with suspi-
cious cases of pneumonia. To prevent SARS transmission,
all healthcare workers and visitors entering hospitals in
Toronto and Taiwan were screened for symptoms or epi-
demiologic links to settings where transmission was
known or suspected. Epidemiologic links are important
discriminators for considering a diagnosis of SARS; how-
ever, before any global SARS activity and during periods
of notable local transmission, these epidemiologic links
may lose their discriminating ability. Ultimately, vigilant
and intuitive clinicians may be the best means of recogniz-
ing cases of SARS.
Minimizing Transmission through 
Early Detection and Intervention 
Hospital emergency departments were important sites
for SARS transmission during the early part of the out-
break in Toronto (5). In Taiwan, transmission in the emer-
gency department occurred through unrecognized
case-patients and during a period when infection control
measures were weakened due to the rapid influx of SARS
patients seeking evaluation. A number of administrative,
engineering, and other controls were eventually imple-
mented to minimize transmission of SARS in emergency
departments in both Toronto and Taiwan. One important
activity was “triage screening.” For this, a questionnaire
was administered to entrants to identify SARS symptoms
and exposures. Screening was accompanied by a tempera-
ture check, mandatory hand hygiene by the patient, and
often by providing a surgical mask before admission to the
hospital. These precautions were taken when the patient
was first encountered by hospital staff.  
At the peak of the outbreaks in Toronto and Taiwan,
healthcare providers and public health officials were faced
with the possibility that any person coming to an emer-
gency department with a febrile respiratory illness might
have SARS and might transmit infection to other patients.
In response, officials either constructed or retrofitted exist-
ing facilities to create SARS evaluation centers (i.e.,
“Fever Clinics”) (13). These units were designed to safely
assess large numbers of people while minimizing the risk
for SARS transmission, and in fact in both Toronto and
Taiwan, no transmission was reported in these facilities.
Staff and patients were grouped into cohorts, and a space
of >l m was allocated between patients to make direct con-
tact and droplet transmission less likely. Dedicated
entrances and exits and clearly marked patient pathways
were provided to segregate patients under evaluation.
Provisions were made to ensure adequate ventilation and
air exhaust to reduce the risk for droplet or airborne trans-
mission. In Taiwan, temporary structures with high effi-
ciency filtration were built (Figure 2). In Toronto, both
tents and existing facilities were used. 
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 5, May 2004 779
SARS in Healthcare Facilities, Toronto and Taiwan
Figure 2. A, evaluation center for severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) in Toronto, demonstrating spatial separation of
chairs in waiting area intended to reduce patient-to-patient trans-
mission. B, evaluation center for SARS in Taiwan, demonstrating
triage screening of a patient by a healthcare worker wearing per-
sonal protective equipment.
A
BStrict Adherence to Infection Control Practices 
Early in the global outbreak, SARS-CoV was frequent-
ly transmitted to healthcare workers. At that time, with no
diagnostic assays or therapies, public health officials rec-
ommended personal protective equipment to prevent con-
tact, droplet, and airborne transmission (14). In this
situation, a large number of healthcare workers were
required to wear gowns, gloves, N95 or higher respirators,
and eye protection, often for hours. In the past, this level of
protection had been recommended infrequently for those
treating patients with such infections as active multidrug-
resistant tuberculosis, suspected smallpox, or viral hemor-
rhagic fever (15). In Toronto and Taiwan, nurses,
physicians, and housekeeping and other ancillary staff
required rapid training to familiarize them with appropri-
ate technique for the use of PPE. Additionally in Taiwan,
training was needed for family and hired caretakers who
provided a supportive healthcare function in hospitals in
Taiwan (4).
To facilitate the complicated process of donning and
removing personal protective equipment, officials devel-
oped videos, computer presentations, and posters to train
and remind healthcare workers. In addition, changes in
shift duration and rearrangement of nursing stations in
SARS wards were needed to minimize lapses in infection
control. However, as mentioned, even with fully protected
healthcare workers, SARS transmission continued among
patients, precipitating the second outbreak phase in
Toronto. Glove use outside the immediate care environ-
ment was not recommended, but officials needed to
emphasize the importance of removing gloves and wash-
ing hands after leaving SARS areas to prevent contaminat-
ing the environment or infecting patients.
Experiences in Toronto (5), Taiwan (4), and globally (9)
indicate that the primary mode of SARS transmission is
through direct contact and respiratory droplets. However,
the cluster of SARS cases in Toronto healthcare workers
after the intubation of a patient (10), as well as other
reported superspreader events, suggest the possibility of
limited airborne transmission under certain circumstances.
Hand hygiene, one of the most important and simplest of
interventions, was widely advocated both in the hospital
and in public places. Surgical masks and respirators were
recommended equipment for healthcare workers; however,
use of masks and respirators in Taiwan became common-
place both in and outside the hospital. Inappropriate use of
PPE caused shortages of supplies. In response, officials
developed guidelines for respirator reuse and identified
alternatives for equipment in short supply.
Infection control in Toronto and Taiwan became an
essential public health activity, which required the imple-
mentation of precautions beyond most officials’ experi-
ence and expectations. Public health authorities took an
active role in assessing the adequacy of control measures
in hospitals and in investigating any potential transmis-
sion. Once widespread infection-control practices, along
with other measures, were implemented, the number of
new SARS cases declined. 
Minimizing Exposure Opportunities 
through Patient Isolation 
Instituting recommended airborne transmission precau-
tions for SARS patients required the use of airborne-infec-
tion isolation rooms, also known as “negative pressure”
rooms. During early control of SARS in Taiwan, the small
number of imported cases was adequately contained in
these isolation rooms (7). After the rapid increase of cases,
affected hospitals quickly exceeded their capacity to
accommodate all patients in such isolation rooms. Two ini-
tiatives addressed the problem. First, government officials
provided resources to build new airborn-infection isolation
rooms at hospitals (4). Second, hospital officials grouped
SARS patients in private rooms on dedicated, reengi-
neered, SARS wards with modified ventilation systems
that separated the ward airspace from the remainder of the
hospital. Barriers of plastic sheeting and tape were con-
structed to limit access. When possible, SARS patients
with pneumonia, who presented the highest risk for trans-
mission, were placed in airborne-infection isolation rooms;
other SARS patients were placed in private rooms on the
SARS wards. Restricting SARS care to one unit or ward
allowed the separation of contagious and noncontagious
patients and limited the number of staff with potential
exposures to SARS. Exposure opportunities were further
minimized by maintaining a high staff-to-patient ratio and
a high level of infection-control training on SARS wards. 
In both Toronto and Taiwan, hospital officials restricted
access to affected hospitals by limiting the number of
entryways. Access stations were staffed with personnel to
screen for fever, symptoms, or potential SARS exposures.
Few visitors to SARS patients were allowed, and health-
care workers or visitors exposed to facilities where SARS
transmission had occurred were not permitted to enter non-
SARS areas. Hospitals with notable recent nosocomial
transmission prevented visitors or nonessential staff from
entering. Measures to limit access also included restric-
tions for transferring patients into or out of the hospital. If
medically necessary, transfers were made after consulta-
tion with hospital and public health authorities.
Officials in Toronto and Taiwan considered designating
a single facility to serve as a “SARS hospital” for their
jurisdictions. However, implementing this policy was chal-
lenging. Facilities that were not seriously affected general-
ly did not want to become the principal providers of SARS
care because of concerns regarding liability, impact on
finances, and negative public image. Ultimately, public
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port many hospitals to provide care to SARS patients. This
measure eliminated the need for a designated SARS hospi-
tal while maintaining a higher vigilance for SARS trans-
mission at multiple facilities. In the second phase of the
Toronto outbreak, four facilities where SARS patients
were already residing were designated as SARS hospitals. 
Adapting SARS Control Measures to a Facility
Many infection control activities in Toronto and Taiwan
were resource intensive and difficult to maintain for an
extended period. To prevent unnecessary use of staff and
materials, some measures were implemented only when
transmission in the surrounding community or within the
hospital reached a particular level. For example, using sur-
gical masks throughout a hospital to contain infection in a
healthcare worker or other person with symptoms was only
implemented when transmission in the community was
ongoing or recent transmission had occurred in the facili-
ty. Other functions, such as limiting access, restricting
transfers, and performing surveillance for new-onset ill-
ness among healthcare workers, were initiated at different
times in hospitals on the basis of hospital transmission or
community transmission.
Closing an emergency department or hospital ward also
was linked to the level of transmission within a hospital.
Closings were necessary to prevent additional cases in a
hospital where the risk for transmission was high or the
source of transmission was unknown. However, given the
substantial negative effect on hospital finances and health-
care access in a community, the decision to close a hospi-
tal to new admissions was made only in consultation with
public health authorities. 
Conclusions
On July 5, 2003, the World Health Organization
declared the world free of ongoing SARS transmission
(16). However, the factors that led to the emergence of
SARS are likely still in place, permitting the possibility
that SARS will reemerge. If this happens, nosocomial
transmission and cases among healthcare workers may
also occur. Taking the experiences from Toronto and
Taiwan and applying them to preparedness and prevention
efforts likely will minimize SARS transmission in health-
care facilities.
Dr. McDonald is a medical epidemiologist in the Division of
Healthcare Quality Promotion, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). He led both CDC teams that assisted in the
investigations in Toronto during the SARS 2003 outbreak.
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